Flagship Research
Three briefs on the fault lines manipulators target most.
Each brief is short, fully sourced, and designed for reuse by journalists and policymakers. Figures reflect the most recent public EU and U.S. data available at publication.
Brief 01 · Information Integrity
Manufacturing Doubt: Foreign Information Manipulation Against the U.S.–EU Relationship
Transatlantic Truth Lab · 2026
The transatlantic bond is a strategic target. The European External Action Service (EEAS) documented 540 foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) incidents in 2025, spread across roughly 10,500 channels and websites. Where attribution was possible, 35% of incidents were state-linked — 29% to Russia and 6% to China — and one in four already used AI tools to generate or distribute content. More than 100 countries were targeted, with Russia interfering in elections across Germany, Poland, Romania, Moldova, the Czech Republic, and beyond.
The playbook
These operations rarely invent grievances; they amplify existing ones. NATO assesses Russia to be the main driver of hostile online conversations about Europe's energy transition. Analysts describe a strategy of "erosion rather than shock" — slow, persistent pressure that degrades unity, slows decision-making, and makes publics less willing to absorb risk. Russia and China treat information operations as low-cost, low-risk tools to weaken Euro-Atlantic cohesion without crossing a threshold that would trigger a decisive Western response.
Why it matters
The targets are not random. Manipulators concentrate on the exact sectors that make the partnership strong — energy, defense, critical minerals, and trade — because convincing Europeans that transatlantic cooperation is a liability rather than an asset is the cheapest way to weaken the West. The counter is not censorship but information integrity: faster identification of manipulation and a steady supply of verified, credible facts.
Key facts
- 540 FIMI incidents documented in 2025; ~10,500 amplifying channels.
- 35% of attributable incidents state-linked (29% Russia, 6% China).
- 1 in 4 incidents used AI; 100+ countries targeted.
- NATO names Russia the leading driver of hostile energy-transition narratives.
Sources
- EEAS, 4th Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats, March 2026 — euvsdisinfo.eu
- Atlantic Council; CEPA; FDD; ISPI — analyses of Russian/Chinese information operations targeting Euro-Atlantic unity (2025).
- NATO assessment cited in coverage of Russian energy-transition disinformation (2025).
Brief 02 · Critical Minerals
The Real Dependency: Why U.S.–EU Critical-Minerals Cooperation Is a Strategic Necessity
Transatlantic Truth Lab · 2026
A common manipulative narrative frames U.S.–EU industrial cooperation as a form of dependency or exploitation. The data point the other way. The real strategic vulnerability is concentration in a single supplier: China supplies roughly 100% of the EU's heavy rare earths and about 98% of its rare-earth magnets, controls around 60% of global rare-earth production and ~90% of refining, and — as of the 2023 assessment behind the EU's Critical Raw Materials Act — provided about 97% of the EU's lithium and 93% of its magnesium.
Europe's response
The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act (adopted March 2024) sets 2030 benchmarks — 10% domestic extraction, 40% processing, 25% recycling — and aims to cap single-country dependency at 65% across the value chain. China's tightening of rare-earth export controls in 2025 hit EU rearmament plans directly, underscoring the urgency.
The transatlantic answer
The United States and the EU have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership on Critical Minerals and co-lead the Minerals Security Partnership — a coalition of like-minded economies (including Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the UK, and EU member states) that share information and co-invest in mining, refining, and recycling. Far from creating dependency, transatlantic cooperation is precisely how Europe reduces its most dangerous one.
Key facts
- China: ~100% of EU heavy rare earths; ~98% of rare-earth magnets; ~90% of global refining.
- EU (2023): ~97% of lithium and ~93% of magnesium sourced from China.
- CRMA 2030 targets: 10% extraction / 40% processing / 25% recycling; 65% single-country cap.
- U.S.–EU MoU + Minerals Security Partnership coordinate supply and co-investment.
Sources
- Council of the EU, Critical Raw Materials Act infographic — consilium.europa.eu
- European Parliament (EPRS), China's rare-earth export restrictions, Nov 2025 — epthinktank.eu
- European Commission, Minerals Security Partnership / EU-US critical minerals partnership — ec.europa.eu; MERICS.
Brief 03 · Energy Security
Powering the Alliance: U.S. LNG and the End of Europe's Russian-Gas Dependence
Transatlantic Truth Lab · 2026
One of the most persistent narratives claims Europe simply swapped "cheap Russian gas" for "expensive American dependency." The record tells a different story. After 2022, the United States became Europe's indispensable energy partner: the U.S. now supplies roughly 57–58% of EU LNG imports, and U.S. LNG deliveries to the EU roughly tripled between 2021 and 2025, with 2025 volumes to EU members up more than 60% over 2024.
What actually changed
Russia's share of EU pipeline-gas imports collapsed from around 40% in 2021 to roughly 6% in 2025; counting pipeline and LNG together, Russia accounted for about 12% of total EU gas imports in 2025, down from dominance. American gas did not create dependence — it broke the dependence that Moscow had spent decades building and weaponizing.
The unfinished task
The work is not complete: the EU still imported about 15 million tonnes of Russian LNG in 2025, landing mostly in a few member states. This is exactly where honest information matters — distinguishing genuine policy debate (pace of phase-out, infrastructure, price) from manipulation designed to make Europeans nostalgic for dependence on a hostile supplier.
Key facts
- U.S. = ~57–58% of EU LNG imports; U.S. LNG to EU roughly tripled 2021–2025.
- Russian pipeline-gas share of EU imports: ~40% (2021) → ~6% (2025).
- Russia ≈ 12% of total EU gas imports in 2025 (pipeline + LNG).
- EU still imported ~15 Mt of Russian LNG in 2025 — the phase-out is unfinished.
Coming next: a fourth brief on the U.S.–EU AI economy and how Europe can participate in the emerging AI and compute supply chain alongside the United States.